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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 13-3145 
____________ 
 
JOHN A. BENNETT, M.D.; DEVON ROBOTICS, LLC.;  
DEVON HEALTH SERVICES, INC. 
                                                                            Appellants 
v. 
 
ITOCHU INTERNATIONAL, INC; MEDSURG SPECIALTY DEVICES, INC; 
THOMAS N. APPLE; MOUNIR RABBAT; YOSHIHISA SUZUKI 
      
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Nos. 09-cv-01819, 09-cv-04123) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2014 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 10, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Devon Robotics, LLC, Devon Health Services, Inc., and their owner, John 
Bennett, M.D., appeal a post-trial judgment and a summary judgment on claims for 
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breach of contract, breach of duty to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel, 
and on a counterclaim for breach of contract. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
I 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, 
we recite only the facts and procedural history essential to our decision. 
This appeal arises from a soured partnership between two businessmen and their 
companies. In 2007, Japan-based Itochu International, Inc., began to explore investment 
opportunities in the United States health care industry.  To that end, the head of Itochu’s 
enterprise division, Mounire Rabbat, became acquainted with Dr. John Bennett and his 
medical supply distribution company, Devon Health Services, Inc. (DHS).  Rabbat and 
Bennett discussed two opportunities for cooperation: a multi-million dollar Itochu 
investment in DHS and a joint venture to sell medication-mixing robots.  
The projects never materialized, and this litigation ensued. Rabbat and Bennett 
negotiated the DHS investment and even executed several non-binding letters of interest, 
but Itochu never finalized the deal. The two did come to terms on the robot-selling joint 
venture. Bennett formed a new company, Devon Robotics, Inc., that acquired and then 
leased the distribution rights for the robot to an Itochu subsidiary, MedSurg.  A 
distribution agreement set out the responsibilities for both MedSurg and Devon Robotics. 
The joint venture failed, however. MedSurg could not sell the robot, and each side 
blamed the other for the failure. In the end, Devon Robotics terminated the distribution 
agreement with MedSurg and filed this suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
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Our review is limited to four claims and one counterclaim the District Court 
adjudicated in that suit. Devon Robotics, DHS, and Bennett brought two claims of 
promissory estoppel and Devon Robotics brought one claim of breach of a duty to 
negotiate in good faith.  The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Itochu 
and Rabbat on those claims. The parties went to trial on the competing claims of Devon 
Robotics and MedSurg for breach of the distribution agreement. After the jury returned a 
verdict in MedSurg’s favor, Devon Robotics, DHS, and Bennett filed this timely appeal.1 
II 
A 
 Devon Robotics challenges the jury’s verdict on its claims for breach of the 
distribution agreement. After trial, Devon Robotics renewed its motion for judgment as a 
matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), claiming that the verdict went against the 
weight of evidence. The District Court disagreed and denied the motion.2  We review the 
District Court’s denial of Devon Robotics’s motion de novo, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to MedSurg, as the prevailing party. See Acumed LLC v. Advanced 
Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). Judgment as a matter of law is 
appropriate when the record is “critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence 
                                                        
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
2 Appellants also request a new trial as an alternative to the entry of judgment as a 
matter of law. Because Devon Robotics did not ask for a new trial on these grounds in the 
District Court, it has waived this argument. See Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 
789, 799 (3d Cir. 2001).  
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from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.” Raiczyk v. Ocean Cnty. Veterinary 
Hosp., 377 F.3d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 Devon Robotics first alleged that MedSurg materially breached the distribution 
agreement by failing to hire the contractually required minimum number of salespeople 
and by failing to fill certain roles.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
MedSurg as the verdict winner, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably found 
that MedSurg substantially complied with its obligations. MedSurg introduced evidence 
that Devon Robotics shared in the blame for MedSurg’s incomplete sales staff, even 
firing two of MedSurg’s salespeople.  Moreover, the jury could have reasonably found 
that MedSurg’s breach was not material because of evidence showing that the failure to 
sell robots was caused by performance problems with the robots themselves and the 
economic recession, which made hospitals more cost-conscious.  Accordingly, the jury 
was entitled to conclude that MedSurg did not materially breach its staffing obligations 
under the distribution agreement. 
 Separately, Devon Robotics argued MedSurg breached the distribution agreement 
by refusing to pay for a clinical trial on the robot.  The jury was instructed, without 
objection by Devon Robotics, that MedSurg’s breach must be excused if the jury found 
Devon Robotics had “already decided to terminate the contract or was not acting in good 
faith” when MedSurg’s duty to pay ripened. App. at 1458. MedSurg showed the jury an 
email, sent several days before Devon Robotics demanded payment from MedSurg, in 
which Bennett confirmed that Devon Robotics would terminate the distribution 
agreement.  On that evidence alone, the jury could have reasonably found that Devon 
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Robotics decided to terminate the distribution agreement before it billed MedSurg for the 
clinical trial, thus excusing MedSurg’s failure to pay. For these reasons, we perceive no 
error in the District Court’s dismissal of Devon Robotics’s renewed motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, and we will affirm its order.3  
B 
Devon Robotics claims it is entitled to a new trial because of a series of questions 
at trial about its decision to sell a $7 million investment for $10. Its argument proceeds on 
two fronts: that the testimony was irrelevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and unfairly 
prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion. Acumed, 561 F.3d at 211. At trial, Bennett testified that Itochu caused Devon 
Robotics’s financial demise. The evidence of Devon Robotics’s decision to sell $7 
million in stock for $10 rebutted Dr. Bennett’s assertion, satisfying Rule 401’s relevance 
standard. Devon Robotics claims that the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, and misleading the jury substantially outweighed the probative value of the 
evidence in contravention of Rule 403, saying only that the evidence made Appellants 
“appear dishonest.” Br. of Appellants at 49. We readily conclude that these bare 
allegations fail to demonstrate an abuse of discretion and find no error in the District 
Court’s denial of Devon Robotics’s motion for a new trial.  
                                                        
3 Devon Robotics also argues that the District Court erred in denying its post-
verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on MedSurg’s counterclaim for breach of 
the distribution agreement, which arose from Devon Robotics’s failure to pay 
commissions. The District Court denied this motion because Devon Robotics never made 
a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, which is a prerequisite for the 
District Court to consider a post-verdict motion.  We see no error in the District Court’s 
faithful application of the renewal requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). 
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For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying Devon 
Robotics’s motion for a new trial. 
III 
 Before trial, the District Court entered summary judgment against Devon 
Robotics, DHS, and Dr. Bennett on their claims for promissory estoppel and breach of 
duty to negotiate in good faith. Appellants claim the District Court erred in holding that 
their reliance on these promises was unreasonable as a matter of law.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment. Horvath v. Keystone Health 
Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2003). We will affirm if the moving party 
establishes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
 After reviewing the record before the District Court and considering its thorough 
opinion disposing of these claims, we see no error in the summary judgment. Appellants 
rooted their first promissory estoppel claim in alleged promises by Rabbat to complete 
the investment that DHS and Itochu negotiated. The District Court held that Appellants’ 
reliance on these oral promises was unreasonable as a matter of law because the oral 
promises were contradicted by writings signed by the parties.  Throughout the 
negotiations on the potential DHS investment, the parties executed non-binding letters of 
interest that stated that any binding agreement would result only from a formal, written 
contract and that the investment must win the approval of Itochu’s internal investment 
committee—neither of which occurred.  Appellants’ reliance on oral promises that 
contradicted the parties’ signed writings was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
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Appellants’ second promissory estoppel claim arose from alleged oral promises by 
Rabbat that Itochu would be an equal partner in the robot joint venture. However, Bennett 
admitted that he knew at the time that Itochu’s participation in the joint venture was not 
final until the Itochu investment committee approved the deal. In the view of the District 
Court, Bennett acted on his own hunch that Itochu would join him in the venture and that 
any reliance was unreasonable because he knew the deal was contingent.  We agree with 
the District Court that Bennett’s asserted reliance was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
 Finally, Appellants argued that Itochu breached a duty to negotiate in good faith. 
A duty to negotiate in good faith requires a binding agreement between the parties 
expressing their commitment to negotiate together in good faith and reach a final 
agreement. Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986). The 
District Court granted Itochu summary judgment because Devon Robotics failed to 
identify a specific promise to negotiate in good faith apart from Dr. Bennett’s 
uncorroborated and conclusory allegations to that effect. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 
Appellants argue that a term sheet executed in the course of negotiations on the DHS 
investment included one such promise because the parties agreed to make “a firm and 
committed effort to close” the deal.  Another part of the term sheet, however, uses 
unambiguous language to disclaim any intent by the parties to bind each other.  That fact 
is fatal to the claim. For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s summary 
judgment. 
IV 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Additionally, we 
will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment on Appellants’ claims for promissory 
estoppel and breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith. 
